## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05333-DGE

TONG HE

Plaintiff(s),

v.

KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security;

TODD LYONS, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; ,

Defendant(s).

Tong He 6113 9th St NE Tacoma WA 98422, Phone: 4082013045

PlaintiffTong He, appearing pro se

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction Plaintiff Tong He, a pro se F-1 international student, respectfully moves this Court for a preliminary injunction to restore his Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) record to active F-1 status and enjoin Defendants—U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—from enforcing the unlawful termination of his SEVIS record or taking adverse actions, such as detention or removal, pending resolution of this case. This motion is supported by violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection, and the irreparable harm Plaintiff faces, as recognized by this Court's granting of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on April 24, 2025, 10 and further outlined in the Amended Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, dated April 25, 2025. Pursuant to the Court's Amended Order, which sets the briefing schedule for 11 12 the preliminary injunction hearing on May 7, 2025, Plaintiff files this opening brief in support of his Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent ongoing 13 irreparable harm and maintain the status quo beyond the TRO's expiration on May 9, 2025, while 14 15 this case proceeds to a final determination. 16 Statement of Facts 17 Plaintiff is a master's degree student at Trine University, maintaining a 3.929 GPA and full 18 compliance with F-1 visa requirements since August 2023. On April 9, 2025, Defendants 19 terminated Plaintiff's SEVIS record without notice, explanation, or opportunity to respond. This 20 termination violates DHS regulations (8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d)) and ICE Policy Guidance 1004-04, 21 which prohibit SEVIS termination based solely on visa revocation. As a result, Plaintiff faces 22 immediate and ongoing harms: 23 Unlawful Presence: Daily accrual under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), risking 3/10-year reentry 24 bars. 25 Detention Risk: Potential ICE apprehension or removal as an out-of-status individual.

26 Academic Disruption: Inability to complete his degree, loss of credits, and revocation of Curricular Practical Training (CPT) employment. 27 28 Emotional Distress: Significant stress and reputational harm. These facts are detailed in 29 Plaintiff's Declaration and supported by the Complaint. 30 Legal Standard 31 A preliminary injunction requires Plaintiff to show: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; 32 (2) irreparable harm absent relief; (3) balance of equities favoring Plaintiff; and (4) public interest 33 supporting the injunction (Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Alternatively, in the Ninth Circuit, relief may be granted if Plaintiff raises "serious 34 35 questions going to the merits" and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor, provided 36 other factors are met (Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 37 2011)). 38 Argument 39 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 40 Plaintiff is likely to succeed on his claims under the APA, Fifth Amendment due process, and equal protection, bolstered by judicial findings and the defendants' failure to assure non-41 42 recurrence of unlawful conduct. 43 APA Violations. The SEVIS termination was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). DHS regulations (8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d)) limit SEVIS terminations to 44 specific grounds, none of which apply to Plaintiff, who has no convictions and maintains 45 academic compliance. ICE Policy Guidance 1004-04 explicitly prohibits termination based solely 46 on visa revocation, yet Defendants cited "visa revoked" as the basis. Recent cases, including Jin v. 47 Noem (D.S.D. Apr. 10, 2025), Chen v. Noem (D.S.D. Apr. 11, 2025), and Liu v. Noem (D.N.H. 48

49 Apr. 7, 2025), have found similar terminations unlawful, reinforcing Plaintiff's 50 position. Compelling evidence demonstrates that SEVIS termination results in the loss of valid 51 F-1 nonimmigrant status. In Xiaotian Liu v. Noem (Case No. 1:25-cv-00133-SE-TSM), a USCIS 52 document dated April 19, 2025, explicitly states that SEVIS termination ends lawful 53 nonimmigrant status. This interpretation by USCIS, a DHS component, confirms the severe legal consequences of Defendants' actions. This Court's Order Granting Motion for Temporary 54 55 Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 2), dated April 24, 2025, further supports this, noting that SEVIS 56 termination results in the loss of employment authorization and prevents schools from reporting 57 compliance, rendering students out-of-status (order at 15). These findings, combined with 58 USCIS's stance, establish that the termination was inconsistent with agency practices and 59 arbitrary, significantly strengthening Plaintiff's APA claim. Moreover, the voluntary cessation 60 doctrine precludes Defendants from arguing that the case is moot, even if they temporarily restore 61 Plaintiff's SEVIS record. Under Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000), Defendants bear the "heavy burden" of proving that the wrongful 62 behavior "could not reasonably be expected to recur." In John Doe v. Kristi Noem, et al. (No. 63 2:25-cv-00633-DGE), the plaintiff highlighted Defendants' failure to meet this burden, noting that 64 the April 2025 mass-terminations were based on an unwritten, evolving policy, and ICE retains 65 66 authority to terminate SEVIS records "for other reasons" at any time. The absence of a formal 67 policy change and Defendants' history of reinstating records only under court pressure (e.g., post-68 TRO on April 17, 2025, in Doe v. Noem) suggest a high likelihood of recurrence, necessitating 69 injunctive relief to protect Plaintiff. 70 Due Process Violation. Plaintiff's F-1 status constitutes a protected liberty and property 71 interest (Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982)). The termination without notice or

opportunity to respond violates Fifth Amendment due process (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

72

73 319, 333 (1976)). Courts in Jin, Chen, and S.Y. v. Noem (D.S.D. Apr. 12, 2025) upheld this 74 argument, finding that abrupt SEVIS terminations without process are unconstitutional. The lack 75 of procedural safeguards in Plaintiff's case mirrors these precedents, enhancing his likelihood of 76 success. 77 Equal Protection Violation. Defendants' pattern of targeting Chinese F-1 students 78 suggests discriminatory enforcement, violating the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause 79 (Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). Chen v. Noem raised similar concerns, noting 80 selective enforcement against specific nationalities. This discriminatory pattern raises serious 81 questions sufficient for relief under the Ninth Circuit's alternative standard (Alliance for the Wild 82 Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1134-35). 83 B. Irreparable Harm 84 Plaintiff faces immediate and irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction, as the 85 SEVIS termination inflicts ongoing damages that cannot be remedied by monetary compensation. 86 The following harms underscore the urgency of the May 7, 2025, hearing. 87 Accrual of Unlawful Presence. Since April 9, 2025, Plaintiff has been accruing 88 unlawful presence under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), risking 3- or 10-year reentry bars. This 89 permanent stain on his immigration record cannot be undone, constituting irreparable harm (Chen 90 v. Noem, D.S.D. Apr. 11, 2025; Roe and Doe v. Noem, D.S.D. Apr. 10, 2025). Plaintiff's 91 Declaration details his discovery of the termination via a consular email, with no 92 administrative recourse, amplifying the harm's severity. This Court's TRO Order (Dkt. No. 2) 93 recognized unlawful presence as a direct consequence of SEVIS termination, justifying immediate relief. 94 95 Risk of Detention or Removal. As an out-of-status individual, Plaintiff faces imminent 96 risk of ICE apprehension, detention, or removal. This threat to liberty is a fundamental irreparable

97 harm (Jin v. Noem, D.S.D. Apr. 10, 2025; Liu v. Noem, D.N.H. Apr. 7, 2025). In S.Y. v. Noem 98 (D.S.D. Apr. 12, 2025), the court granted a TRO based on similar risks, a precedent this Court 99 echoed in its TRO Order (Dkt. No. 2), emphasizing the need to shield Plaintiff from enforcement 100 actions. 101 Academic and Professional Disruption. The SEVIS termination has revoked Plaintiff's CPT employment and barred class registration at Trine University, jeopardizing his master's 102 degree completion. Educational and professional disruptions are well-established irreparable 103 104 harms for international students (Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014)). Plaintiff's Declaration documents these impacts, and the TRO Order (Dkt. No. 105 2) acknowledged their severity, warranting injunctive relief. 107 Emotional and Reputational Harm. The abrupt termination has caused Plaintiff significant 108 emotional distress and reputational damage, stigmatizing him as out-of-status despite his 109 exemplary record. In the immigration context, such harms are recognized as irreparable (Liu v. Noem). The TRO Order (Dkt. No. 2) noted the broader impact of termination, supporting the need 111 for relief to mitigate these effects. 112 C. Balance of Equities 113 The balance of equities sharply favors Plaintiff. The catastrophic harms—loss of legal status, education, employment, and risk of deportation—far outweigh the minimal administrative 115 burden on Defendants to restore Plaintiff's SEVIS record. Courts in Jin, Chen, and S.Y. v. Noem 116 consistently found this balance favors plaintiffs. In Doe v. Noem, the plaintiff argued that preserving the status quo imposes no material burden on Defendants, while failure to act risks 118 Plaintiff's academic and professional future and investments in education. Defendants' 119 history of disregarding regulations (Doe v. Noem, citing mass visa cancellations and warrantless 120 arrests) suggests that without an injunction, the risk of re-termination remains high (United States

121	v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
122	D. Public Interest
123	Granting the injunction serves the public interest by ensuring agency compliance with the
124	APA and constitutional protections, safeguarding the integrity of the F-1 program, and supporting
125	U.S. universities and the economy (Liu v. Noem). The public also benefits from procedural
126	regularity and the protection of federally funded research, as highlighted in Doe v. Noem. Judicial
127	trends, as reported by the New York Times, indicate skepticism about the lawfulness of abrupt
128	SEVIS terminations, reinforcing the public's stake in upholding lawful processes (U.S. Restores
129	Legal Status for Many International Students).
130	E. Scope and Necessity of the Preliminary Injunction
131	The preliminary injunction must encompass the TRO's relief (dated April 24, 2025,
132	amended April 25, 2025) to prevent a lapse in protection upon the TRO's expiration on May 9,
133	2025. The Court should order:
134	Restoration of Plaintiff's SEVIS record to active F-1 status, absent lawful termination
135	under 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.1(d), 214.2(f).
136	Enjoinment of Defendants from enforcing the unlawful SEVIS termination.
137	Prohibition of adverse actions, such as detention or removal, pending case resolution.
138	Waiver of any bond requirement, as the relief imposes no material burden on Defendants
139	but is critical to Plaintiff (Doe v. Noem).
140	Necessity of the Preliminary Injunction Hearing. The May 7, 2025, hearing is
141	indispensable to address the ongoing risk of re-termination, particularly given Defendants'
142	potential mootness argument, as raised by attorney Whitney Passmore in Doe v. Noem (No. 2:25-
143	cv-00633-DGE). Passmore's opposition in that case claimed the issue was moot due to temporary
144	SEVIS restoration, but the plaintiff countered that Defendants' unwritten, evolving policy and lack

of formal reversal leave students vulnerable. Plaintiff anticipates a similar defense here, 145 146 necessitating the hearing to evaluate Defendants' assurances against their history of arbitrary 147 actions. The voluntary cessation doctrine (Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189) requires Defendants to prove non-recurrence, a burden they have not met, as evidenced by their equivocal 148 149 statements and retention of termination authority (Doe v. Noem). Without the hearing, Plaintiff risks re-termination, which would strip his lawful status, halt his education, and expose him to 150 151 enforcement actions. The hearing is critical to assess collateral consequences, such as barriers to future immigration benefits, which persist even if SEVIS is temporarily restored (MedImmune, 152 Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)). The Amended Order's scheduling of the 153 hearing underscores its urgency, and Plaintiff's compliance with evidence requirements (Exhibit A) strengthens the case for relief. 155 156 Importance of Extending TRO in Related Cases. The necessity of extending interim relief is vividly illustrated in Rattanand Ratsantiboon v. Kristi Noem, et al. (No. 0:25-cv-01315-JMB-157 JFD) and Ziliang Jin v. Kristi Noem, et al. (No. 0:25-cv-01391-JMB-JFD), where Judge Jeffrey 158 159 M. Bryan extended the TRO for 14 days in each case. In Rattanand Ratsantiboon (No. 0:25-cv-01315-JMB-JFD), the court extended the TRO on April 29, 2025, citing uncertainties surrounding 160 ICE's new policy on SEVIS terminations, the unclear effects of this policy shift on plaintiffs with reinstated SEVIS records, and the potential impact on the plaintiff's ability to register for courses. 163 The court required Defendants to maintain the plaintiff's SEVIS authorization as active retroactive to March 28, 2025, and prohibited further termination actions, with briefing ordered by May 8, 2025, to assess further extension needs. Similarly, in Ziliang Jin (No. 0:25-cv-01391-JMB-JFD), 165 the court extended the TRO for 14 days on April 29, 2025, for identical reasons, ensuring the 166 plaintiff's SEVIS record remained active retroactive to April 8, 2025, and enjoining adverse 167 168 actions. These extensions underscore the critical need for continued protection amid evolving

immigration policies, preventing abrupt disruptions to students' legal status and academic progress. The courts' actions in these cases highlight the risk of harm without extended interim relief, reinforcing the urgency of Plaintiff's preliminary injunction to bridge the gap beyond the TRO's expiration.

173 Conclusion

The Court should grant a preliminary injunction to restore Plaintiff's SEVIS record,
enjoin enforcement of the unlawful termination, and prohibit adverse actions pending case
resolution. The May 7, 2025, hearing is essential to counter Defendants' likely mootness defense,
as raised by Whitney Passmore in Doe v. Noem, and to ensure Plaintiff's protection beyond the
TRO's expiration. Plaintiff's strong likelihood of success, irreparable harms, and the public
interest in lawful governance justify this relief, consistent with this Court's prior findings and
recent judicial trends in cases like Rattanand Ratsantiboon and Ziliang Jin.

Dated: May 1, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

/c/

Page 9 of 9

Tong He, Pro Se 6113 9th St NE Tacoma WA 98422

4082013045 hetong1900@gmail.com